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INTRODUCTION
Few ideas reverberate at the core of the human psyche as strongly
as that of atonement. Both as individuals and as a society, we expect
individuals who commit wrongful acts to seek expiation. From a par-
ent's admonishment to a child to "say you're sorry" to national lead-
ers' apologies on the behalf of their nations for past societal wrongs,
the value we place on atonement and our desire to cultivate it as a
fundamental societal tenet are seen every day. When the wrongful act
is especially egregious, such as the intentional taking of human life,
t Professor of Law, Washington & Lee School of Law. National Science Foundation
Grant SES 90-13252 provided funding for the Capital Jury Project. The Frances Lewis Law
Center supported the research and writing of this Article. I would like to thank partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at Washington & Lee School of Law and Professor David
Faigman, whose comments, as always, were insightful and helpful. I also am very grateful
to the students-too numerous to name individually-at Hastings College of the Law and
Washington & Lee who spent endless hours doing logistical work, helping conduct the
interviews, and processing the mountain of data. Most of all, I want to thank those jurors
who invested the time and emotion in helping us begin to understand how juries make
their decisions.
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we view those who refuse to seek absolution as outcasts who have for-
feited their claim to live in society.
It is of little surprise to learn, therefore, that a defendant's lack of
remorse often plays an influential role in shaping the outcome of cap-
ital trials. A study of prosecutors' dosing arguments in favor of a
death sentence concluded that "[w]henever possible, prosecutors em-
phasized the defendant's apparent lack of remorse."' Preliminary
findings from prior studies of capital juries have found that such a
rhetorical strategy apparently often hits its mark: jurors frequently
cited a defendant's lack of remorse as a significant factor in precipitat-
ing their decision to impose the death penalty.2 What has not been
examined, however, is how jurors draw their conclusions about a de-
fendant's degree of remorse, how different trial strategies affect their
perceptions, and how those perceptions influence their decision of
whether to sentence the defendant to death.3
This Article sheds light on these unanswered questions by explor-
ing exactly how capital jurors use a defendant's degree of remorse
when choosing between a death sentence and a sentence of life with-
out parole.4 Specifically, the Article demonstrates that simply stating
that capital juries use remorselessness as a major reason for sentenc-
ing defendants to death does not fully capture the role of remorse in
capital cases. Indeed, once the full spectrum of jurors is taken into
account-both those that sentenced defendants to life ("life jurors")
and those that imposed the death penalty ("death jurors")-it be-
comes apparent that an assessment of remorse involves considerably
more than merely a consideration of whether defendants are sorry for
their crimes. Instead, the Article finds that much of how juries use
1 Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase: A
Content Analysis of Closing Arguments, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 125, 137.
2 See Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase
16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 198 (1992); William S. Geimer &Jonathan Amsterdam, Why
Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Rorida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L.
1, 51-52 (1987-88); Craig Haney et al., Deciding to Take a Life: CapitalJuries, Sentencing Instruc-
tions, and the Jurisprudence of Death, J. Soc. IssuEs, Summer 1994, at 149, 163-64; see also
WELSH S. WHITE, THE DATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 85-90 (1991) (explaining that vari-
ous factors, such as the extent of the defendant's remorse, influence the jury's penalty
decision). As White notes, "[A] personal expression of remorse... [makes] it easier for
the jury to see [the defendant] as a person, a member of the human community rather
than a monster." Id. at 86.
3 Costanzo & Costanzo, supra note 2, at 196 (noting that "[vlirtually nothing is
known about the relationship between guilt and penalty phases").
4 In California, a jury that convicts a defendant of first-degree murder and finds a
"special circumstance" that qualifies the defendant for the death penalty has only two sen-
tencing alternatives: the death penalty or life without parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)
(West 1998). Yet, even when the jury finds a "special circumstance," the prosecution is not
required to seek the death penalty, in which case the defendant is sentenced to life without
parole. See People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1097-98 (Cal. 1988) (upholding the prosecu-
tor's discretion to seek a death sentence).
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remorse focuses on how the defense presents its case to the jury rather
than on expectations that the defendant will express sorrow for his
actions. The Article concludes by looking at some of the practical and
ethical implications of these findings for a defense attorney preparing
a capital case for trial.
This Article uses data from the California segment of the Capital
Jury Project ("Project"), a nationwide study of the factors that influ-
ence the decision of capital jurors on whether to impose the death
penalty.5 In total, the California segment of the Project included
thirty-seven sentencing proceedings in which prosecutors asked juries
that had convicted defendants of first-degree murder to return death
sentences. 6 Of the thirty-seven proceedings, defendants in nineteen
cases received death sentences, defendants in seventeen cases re-
ceived sentences of life without parole, and one case ended in a hung
jury over the penalty.7 During extensive interviews,8 interviewers
posed questions to jurors to gather both qualitative and quantitative
data regarding what factors had influenced them and the jury panels
on which they sat in deciding whether to impose a death sentence.
A methodological caveat should be noted before proceeding to
the Article's findings. Although the cases included in the study are
representative of the pool from which they were drawn,9 the results
must be considered with the caution warranted by a total sample size
of thirty-seven cases and the smaller subsets that are studied through-
out this Article. Furthermore, although this Article attempts to ac-
count for other factors that might affect the analysis, the data on
5 See generally WilliamJ. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995) (describing the background, purposes, and method-
ology of the Capital Jury Project). The author of this Article served as the Principal Investi-
gator of the California segment of the Capital Jury Project.
6 The 37 cases were tried during the years 1988-92, and the interviews were con-
ducted between 1991 and 1992. The study drew cases from a geographic area covering six
counties in the middle third of the state. Only trials held within the preceding three years
qualified for the study. The study gave priority to jurors from recent cases. The selection
process was designed to maintain a balance between life and death outcomes and to obtain
a sample of trials from different regions and involving different offenses. See id. at 1077-81.
The author previously has used data from 36 of these 37 cases to study the effects of
various types of witness testimony on jurors in capital cases. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as
Critic: An Empirical Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv.
1109 (1997). This Article includes data from an additional death case not incorporated in
that prior Article.
7 The prosecution retried the penalty phase of the one case that had resulted in a
hungjury-as allowed under California law, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West 1988)-
and secured a death sentence. The retrial is one of the 19 death cases from which the
study selected jurors to interview.
8 Interviews ranged from two to 12 hours and averaged between three and four
hours each. The interviewer filled out a 50 page questionnaire as the interviewee re-
sponded orally to the questions. Most interviewees allowed the interviewer to tape-record
the interview; otherwise, the interviewer transcribed the juror's responses.
9 See Bowers, supra note 5, at 1077-81.
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which it is based have not undergone a multiple regression analysis. 10
As a result, it is possible that additional factors might have contributed
to some of the observations made in this Article regarding the effects
of different trial strategies. The Article's analysis, therefore, is offered
as a detailed look at the role of remorse and its interaction with trial
strategy, but with the recognition that a continuing need exists to
study the issues from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective."
I
DEATH JURIES AND THE ROLE OF REMORSE
The interviews ofjurors who served on ajury that imposed a sen-
tence of death ("death jurors") strongly corroborated earlier findings
that the defendant's degree of remorse significantly influences ajury's
decision to impose the death penalty. Jurors not only identified the
perceived degree of the defendant's remorse as one of the most fre-
quently discussed issues in the jury room during the penalty phase, 12
but the topic also pervaded the interviews themselves. Overall, 69% of
the death jurors who participated in the study (fifty-four of seventy-
eight jurors) pointed to lack of remorse as a reason for their vote in
favor of the death penalty. Many of those jurors cited it as the most
compelling reason for their decision. Moreover, it was a theme that
arose in every one of the death cases; at least one interviewed juror in
each of the nineteen cases raised lack of remorse as a factor that had
influenced his decision to sentence the defendant to death.
The pervasiveness of the death jurors' view that the defendant in
their case was remorseless is apparent in their responses to the follow-
ing question: "When you were considering the punishment, did you
believe that the defendant was truly sorry for the crime?"
10 A study conducted by Professor Baldus, which used multiple regression analysis
accounting for 230 potential factors, is the most comprehensive statistical look at the death
penalty to date. See David C. Baldus et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251, 255-62 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S.
Laufer eds., 1992) [hereinafter Baldus, Law and Statistics] (presenting statistical evidence
that defendants who kill white victims are considerably more likely to receive a death sen-
tence than defendants who kill African American victims); see also David C. Baldus et al.,
Racial Discrimination and the Dealth Penalty in Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Over-
view, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1684-95 (1998) [here-
inafter Baldus, Philadelphia Findings] (discussing the use of multiple regression analysis to
analyze race effects in capital cases, and the benefits of using this analysis, in the context of
the Philadelphia portion of the Capital Jury Project).
11 In a separate article in this symposium, Professors Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells
take a much needed statistical look at the role of various factors in shaping capital jurors'
perspectives about whether defendants are remorseful. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., But
Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1599 (1998).
12 Two-thirds of the jurors stated that their panel had discussed the defendant's de-
gree of remorse during the sentencing phase either a "great deal" (26%) or a "fair
amount" (40%).
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TABLE 1
DEATH JURoRs' PERCEPTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' REMORSE
When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that the defendant
was truly sorry for the crime?
,Juror Response (7r=78)
No. ofjurors % ofjurors
Yes, sure he was sorry 3 4
Yes, I think he was sorry 4 5
Not sure, he acted sorry but it might have been
just a show 3 4
No, he acted sorry, but it was a show 2 2
No, he didn't even pretend to be sorry 66 85
When reviewing these findings, it is important to remember that,
with a few notable exceptions,' 3 most defendants did not testify. Con-
sequently, jurors generally based their conclusion that a defendant
lacked remorse on factors other than the defendant's words at trial.
In some cases, the jurors based their perceptions on the nature of the
defendant's actions at the time of the crime.
Interviewer: Among the topics you did discuss, what was the sin-
gle most important factor in the jury's decision about what defen-
dant's punishment should be?
Juror: The special circumstances of how he killed the woman,
and then actually told other people that he did it. He told other
people that she was pleading for her life and he "blew her away." I
think some of the words were "I killed the bitch" or something like
that. (M1D 1). 14
In several other cases, the jury deduced the defendant's lack of re-
morse from his improper acts while in custody, such as making a
weapon ("after he was in prison, he made a weapon out of a tooth-
brush-he had absolutely no remorse whatsoever"), (F 1D 2), or at-
tempting to escape, (M 2D).
Above all else, however, the defendant's demeanor and behavior
during the actual trial shaped the jurors' perceptions of the defen-
13 See infra text accompanying notes 35-36, 66-69, 84-88; infra Part uII.B.1, D.
14 To protect the anonymity of the jurors who participated in the study, this Article
identifies quotes from jurors with an "M" and "F" to indicate gender, followed by a sequen-
tially assigned number according to when the juror is first quoted in the Article. In addi-
don, the Article indicates whether the jury in each case returned a life sentence ("L"),
death sentence ("D"), or hung on the sentence ("H"), and then indicates the case's se-
quentially assigned number.
The author has verified all of the quotations in this Article for accuracy against the
primary source (i.e., the tape or interviewer's notes). The Article's descriptions of cases
are based on the jurors' recollections. When necessary, the author has bracketed material
to protect anonymity or to clarify the context of a quotation. To protect confidentiality,
the author maintains the file of all of the materials used in this Article.
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dant's remorse. Jurors scrutinized the defendant throughout the
course of the trial, and they were quick to recall details about de-
meanor, ranging from his attire to his facial expressions. 15 Although
the following juror's comment is stated somewhat more voyeuristically
than mostjurors' remarks, it does capture the high level of awareness
that the jurors brought to the courtroom:
[He] very seldom looked at the jury. I was always looking at
him. I was always trying to catch his eye. When I was there I
watched him a lot. In fact, I watched all of them. That was part of
the experience-to watch. I roamed the audience, I watched him, I
watched the judge, I watched the lawyers. I'm a snoop; I like look-
ing, so it was just really neat for me. I just was in heaven watching
expressions, watching all the people. That part was interesting.
(M5L2).
Interestingly, the jurors did not focus on the defendant's de-
meanor due to some misguided belief in physiognomy (i.e., the defen-
dant looked like an evil person). At first, in fact, the death jurors
usually perceived the defendant's appearance as non-threatening or
even likable. Typical comments would observe: the defendant
"looked too nice to commit murder," (M4D5 ) ;16 "by appearance, you
would have thought, 'here's Joe College,"' (M 6D6); or the defendant
was "likeable," (F 6D 7). 17 Having often brought a Hollywood-inspired
expectation to their jury service that the defendant would look "crimi-
nal," many jurors were surprised that the defendant had appeared so
harmless at the outset of the trial.18 Only the rare juror claimed that
he had sized up the defendant as a killer from the outset, like the
juror who reported that upon first seeing the defendant he "had a bad
15 Lawyers may want to note that the recall of sartorial detail was not limited to the
defendant. Indeed, sometimes jurors' fashion comments were based on an unfavorable
comparison of the attorney's dress to the defendant's attire: "The defendant always wore
the exact same outfit.... I could say the same for the prosecuting attorney-he wore the
same suit every day," (F2L1); "[The defendant] dressed better than his attorney did,"
(F3D 4).
16 This defendant's appearance in particular garnered comments from the jurors.
Two jurors expressly stated that the defendant's appearance was "confusing" because the
defendant "was likeable," (MsD5), and he "did not look like a killer," (M4D5). Otherjurors
on the panel likewise commented that he looked "like the Pillsbury doughboy, like you
could have put your arm around him and felt very comfortable," (F4Ds), and that "he was
such a normal looking guy-I thought a number of times this guy could be my kid
brother," (F5Ds).
17 Other comments along these lines included: "[The defendant] was dressed up to
look like an accountant or a banker," (F7Ds); "[T]o look at him, you would not think he
was a criminal," (M7D 9); "He was a good looking man, the ladies of the jury were kind of
impressed with him. Didn't look like a killer to me," (MsH 1); "If I had seen him sitting
anywhere else, I would have thought that he was a nice, perfectly sincere person," (F8D10).
18 Ajuror in a life case succinctly captured this feeling of surprise by saying: "When I
first saw him, I didn't know it was a murder case.... I thought it must be a civil case or
something. He looked pretty clean-cut." (MgL).
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feeling that... I don't know how I can describe it. It's kinda like the
feeling you would have when you first saw a rattlesnake." (M10D1l).
Although most jurors did not initially view the defendant's de-
meanor as frightening or remorseless, those early perceptions often
radically changed shortly after the trial began. In a few cases, the de-
fendants displayed their lack of remorse rather bluntly. In two stark
examples, the defendants angered jurors by laughing during the pro-
ceedings, 19 especially during testimony about the victim, and by
openly engaging in flirtatious behavior.20 Almost unbelievably, the
defendant in one of these cases directed his flirtations toward ajuror.
(F10D4) .21 In a third case, the defendant set the tone of the trial early
when, after his attorney announced in the presence of the newly
seated jury that the defense was satisfied with the jury, the defendant
declared, "no, we're not," and engaged the judge in a yelling match.
This defendant's disruptive interventions continued throughout the
trial, which led the jurors to conclude that the defendant was "utterly
remorseless." (F 1D13 ).22
In most cases, however, the defendant did not exhibit such fla-
grantly callous behavior. Instead, jurors had to deduce remorseless-
ness from the defendant's general demeanor during the course of the
trial. What struck jurors again and again was the defendant's lack of
emotion during the trial, even as the prosecution introduced into evi-
dence horrific depictions of his crimes. A thesaurus editor looking for
entries to describe someone without any human emotion simply could
look to a sampling of the death jurors' descriptions of various
defendants:
"He was blas6, an expressionless person. When we were ready
to go out and give the verdict, I was almost ready to cry, and yet
there was never any expression from him. It was like doing a trial on
a wooden plank." (F12D1).
"Just really bored with the whole thing. He sbrt ofjust doodled
through the whole thing. Even during the testimony of the child
[survivor who discovered his parents' bodies], he did not seem to
show any emotion at all." (M12D5).
"He appeared unconcerned. He kind of had a cocky air, like it
didn't really matter." (F13D8).
19 "I was really appalled by it all because he would laugh; he would find things funny
and would sit there and would laugh." (F3D4).
20 "[He was] flirting and winking at the people-the women that came in and that
kind of thing." (F9D12).
21 The juror with whom the defendant had flirted described herself as "repulsed."
(F10D4). Anotherjuror urged her to "flip [him] the bird" in response, but she feared that
it would cause a mistrial.
22 Similarly, one juror characterized another defendant who had laughed periodically
and had engaged in disruptive behavior as "very unremorseful." (M11D14).
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"It appeared that he was bored and indifferent to the whole
thing. I guess you imagine him sitting there and crying or some-
thing, but there was no emotion. I never saw any emotion." (M6D 6).
"There seemed to be such a lack of feeling, compassion on the
defendant's part-to describe it you could say he was cocksure or
appeared to be." (F 14D2).
"Nonchalant." (F 15D 2).
"Never made any eye contact with the jury. Just sat there with
his head down and showed no feeling at all-I wanted him to show
some emotion." (F,6D9).
"He never seemed moved by anything, not [the autopsy] pic-
tures, the slides, nothing got a reaction out of him. He had this
little manila folder, and he would take notes all the time. He wore
these horn-rimmed glasses, and I was really appalled by it all. If it
were me, I would throw myself at the mercy of the court. I would
talk 'til I was blue in the face. I would say something-not just sit
there with a smirk on my face." (F3 D4).
"Cocky, to the point that he'd wave to all the jurors when he
was introduced in court." (F 17D5).
"The defendant acted as though the entire trial was a farce. It
seemed as if he resented the fact that he had to be put through the
process, as if we were inconveniencing him." (MI3D 11).
"[W]hen I looked at him, he always seemed to be the same.
There never seemed to be any different kind of expression. He just
never seemed to change-ever." (Fl8D14).
'e saw no remorse-almost a cocky attitude." (F 19D 15).
"Cocky, disruptive, clever, smart, calculating. Did I say disrup-
tive?" (F 20D 13).
As the comments indicate, the defendants' lack of visible emotion
and their perceived attitude of nonchalance, or even boredom, en-
gendered both anger and astonishment in the jurors. As stated by
one juror, "I just couldn't imagine sitting there seeing the victim's
mother and ... father and sister-in-law and even the children and,
still, no emotion." (F 5D 4) .23 That the defendant could show so little
concern, and even be cocky and arrogant in some instances, indicated
to most jurors that the defendant lacked any sense of human compas-
sion or remorse. One juror aptly explained why the lack of emotion
was so upsetting: "We would have liked to have spoken to him because
he showed so little emotion and so little remorse. We just wanted to
kind of figure out, are you human? We were kind of looking for any-
23 Jurors sometimes explained their shock at the defendant's attitude by comparing
how they or their friends would have behaved had they been in the defendant's position.
One juror, for instance, had a son who had been battling many of the same drug and
alcohol problems that had plagued the defendant. Although initially inclined toward
showing sympathy, this juror pointed out that, unlike the defendant, if her son "had done
something like this, he would have been full of remorse." (F1D2):
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thing, anything to find remorse." (M14D15). This type of angry bewil-
derment over how defendants on trial for their lives and faced with
graphic evidence of their heinous misdeeds could be so emotionless
led one juror to observe with a sense of morbid satisfaction: "He was
just there staring ahead. He never looked at us, never met our eyes-
except when we gave him the death penalty. Then he looked at us, and
that felt real good." (M1D1).
Given the great importance that the death jurors placed on the
defendant's remorselessness, it is not surprising that many jurors said
that if the defendant had made some showing of remorse they might
have switched their votes from death to life. One juror offered a
rather vivid expression of the jury's desire to hear the defendant sin-
cerely say he was sorry for his actions:
If he had given me any type of sorry-something to indicate his
sorrow for what he's done. I wouldn't be interested in him begging
for his life, butjust for him to have said, first of all, he was sorry, and
second of all, just being sincere, that he wished he'd never done it
and all this type of thing. Maybe that is a kind of begging-I don't
know. Otherwise I'm seeing him as cold, calculated and controlled,
and having no remorse or feeling whatsoever for what he has done,
and that to me made a big impression. I don't know if it would have
changed a great deal, but yes, it would have made some difference
in the balance-we were told to balance; I forget the exact words-
the good and the bad, in a sense, and it would have made a differ-
ence. (F12D1) 24
In thirteen of the nineteen death cases, at least one juror explicitly
insisted that he would have voted for life rather than death had the
defendant shown remorse.2 5
The lessons learned so far confirm what both prior studies and
common sense suggest: defendants who are sentenced to death are
highly likely to have been seen by the jurors as remorseless. The ju-
rors based their perceptions of a defendant's lack of remorse largely
on the defendant's demeanor at trial, which ranged from emotionally
flat at best to cocky or arrogant at worst. Because the death jurors
perceived this demeanor as disturbingly inconsistent with what they
24 One juror in a different case commented less reticently: "It's very true, [saying he
was sorry] might have swayed us, I have to admit, because there was a lot of why the hell
didn't he get his butt up there and say something. Beg!" (M6D6).
25 In addition, these statements often reflected a belief that others on the jury would
have voted for life. For example, one juror simply declared:
Everybody was just waiting for him to say he didn't mean to do it. The
defense had already pretty much admitted that he had done it. So if he'd
have just gone up and said, "hey, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to do it," the jury
would not have sentenced him to death-they would not have. (M1 5D16).
Another juror in a different case stated, "I know that for some of the women, if he would
have been repentant, they would never have been able to give death." (M10Dn).
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considered would be a typical human reaction to having committed
such a horrible crime, they viewed it as clear evidence of the defen-
dant's lack of remorse. In turn, jurors often then relied upon the
defendant's remorselessness as a primary reason for imposing the
death sentence. Jurors also frequently articulated the reverse corol-
lary that they likely would have voted for a life sentence instead of
death had the defendant expressed remorse.
All of these observations suggest that defense attorneys represent-
ing defendants who are either unwilling or unable to testify and con-
vince the jury that they are truly sorry inevitably should brace
themselves for hearing the jury announce a verdict of "death." They
would be wrong.
II
LIFE JURIEs AND THE ROLE OF REMORSE
"He didn't pretend to be anything. He just didn't show a lot of
emotion." (F21L3).
"He just showed no emotion, just like this was a walk in the
park." (F22L3).
"Very clinical." (F23L4).
"It was just like, 'I'll get off.' I mean really it was stone face.
There was no emotion." (F2L1).
"I felt sick thinking how anyone could do such a thing and sit
there and act like nothing is going on." (F24L5).
'Just sat there. He didn't do much expression at all. He didn't
show any emotion at all." (M16L6).
"He appeared relaxed, just like another day, and of course, no
remorse, because he didn't do it, so why should he be sorry?"
(F25L7).
"He was just a lump on a log, sitting there." (M17L2).
"He never really showed any emotion. Just like, 'hey, no big
deal.'" (M22L12).
"I actually felt like he did not take it seriously. He laughed sev-
eral times." (F26L8).
"He was very casual about everything that was happening. He
was trying to be cool, you know, he was just trying to be a tough
guy." (M 1 8L).
"We didn't see any remorse, acted or real." (M19L10).
One might have predicted from the importance that the death
jurors placed on a defendant's perceived lack of remorse that the life
jurors would have seen their defendants as having shown signs of re-
morse during the trial. Surprisingly, however, the above observations
by the life jurors are largely interchangeable with the death jurors'
descriptions of their defendant's demeanor. As the comments indi-
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cate, the defendants who received life sentences generally presented
to the jury the same emotionally flat demeanor as the defendants
whom the jury sentenced to death.26 The only noteworthy difference
between the reflections of the two classes of jurors is that the life ju-
rors did not pepper their descriptions with adjectives such as "arro-
gant" and "cocky" to the same extent as the deathjurors.27 Otherwise,
the descriptions are strikingly similar.
Moreover, like the death jurors, life jurors were not particularly
likely to believe that the defendant was sorry for his crime.
TABLE 2
LnFE JuRoRs' PERCEPTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' REMORSE
When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that the defendant
was truly sorry for the crime?
Juror Response (n=70)
No. ofjurors % ofjurors
Yes, sure he was sorry 13 19
Yes, I think he was sorry 8 11
Not sure, he acted sorry but it might have been
just a show 9 13
No, he acted sorry, but it was a show 5 7
No, he didn't even pretend to be sorry 35 50
As the figures show, less than one-third of the life jurors thought that
the defendant was remorseful, and only one-fifth were "sure" that he
was sorry. On the other hand, 57% of the jurors expressed certainty
that the defendant was not sorry, either because they felt he did not
even pretend to be remorseful, or because they believed any indica-
tions of remorse were merely hollow acts for the jury's benefit. Addi-
26 Like the death jurors, the life jurors' initial impressions of the defendants were
generally positive:
"He seemed very well mannered. It was scary to look at him after hear-
ing all of this and think that you would never look at that person and think
they were capable of that. You look at the drunks on the street, the white
trash, and you're afraid of those people-you're not afraid of this clean-cut
eighteen year old." (F27L11).
"If I met him on the street and I didn't know anything about him, I'd
say, yeah, he was likeable." (M20L3).
"When I first saw him, I didn't know it was a murder case.... I thought
it must be a civil case .... he looked pretty clean-cut." (M9L3).
"Reminded me of my grandmother. I thought, 'how could your grand-
mother kill somebody!'" (F28L4).
"[He] could have been a college boy." (M211 7).
"[H]e looked very average, like a working man." (M2L12).
"[He] generally looked nice." (F2I4).
"You'd have to look at him and say, 'how could somebody that looks
pretty normaljust kill two people walking down the street'" (F0L10).
27 For a discussion of this difference, see infra text accompanying notes 78-82.
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tionally, it should be noted that two of the seventeen life cases
accounted almost entirely for the jurors who responded that they were
"sure he was sorry"; the eightjurors interviewed from those cases (four
from each case) all answered that they were "sure" that the defendant
was sorry.
Those two cases-which we will call the "true remorse cases"-
certainly underscore the notion that ajury that believes the defendant
is truly remorseful is very likely to settle on a life sentence. Yet they
also stand out as somewhat unique cases both in terms of their under-
lying facts28 and in that they were the only cases in which every inter-
viewed juror agreed that the defendant was truly sorry. In this light, it
is worthwhile to consider the data without including these two true
remorse cases.
TABLE 3
LIFE JURORS' PERCEPTIONS OF DEFENDANTS' REMORSE EXCLUDING
"TRUE REMORSE" CASES
When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that the defendant
was truly sorry for the crime?
Juror Response (n=62)
No. ofjurors % of jurors
Yes, sure he was sorry 5 8
Yes, I think he was sorry 8 13
Not sure, he acted sorry but it might have been
just a show 9 15
No, he acted sorry, but it was a show 5 8
No, he didn't even pretend to be sorry 35 56
Once the two true remorse cases are excluded, the number of jurors
who thought or were certain that the defendant was remorseful drops
from 30% of all life jurors to only one-fifth, and the percentage of life
jurors who expressed certainty that the defendant lacked remorse
rises to almost two-thirds of the total.
It also is revealing to compare the figures for life jurors to the
figures for death jurors. As with the jurors' comments about de-
meanor, life and death jurors' beliefs about the defendant's remorse
are not as different as one first might expect.
At a minimum, the figures indicate that attorneys representing
remorseless defendants need not resign themselves to a verdict of
death on that basis alone. Even though death jurors placed a great
deal of importance on a defendant's lack of remorse when justifying
their vote for death, less than one-third of the interviewed life jurors
28 See infta text accompanying notes 34-38.
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TABLE 4
LIFE JuRoRS' AN DEATH JURORS' PERCEPTIONS OF
DEFENDANTS' REMORSE
When you were considering the punishment, did you believe that the defendant
was truly sorry for the crime?
Life juror response
Death juror (excluding true Total life juror
response remorse cases) response
(n=78) (n=62) (n=70)
No. of No. of No. of
jurors % ofjurors jurors % ofjurors jurors % ofjurors
Yes, sure he was sorry 3 4 5 8 13 19
Yes, I think hewas sorry 4 5 8 13 8 11
Not sure, he acted sorry
but it might have
been just a show 3 4 9 15 9 13
No, he acted sorry, but
it was a show 2 2 5 8 5 7
No, he didn't even
pretend to be sorry 66 85 35 56 35 50
actually believed that their defendant was sorry for his crime. More-
over, that figure drops to less than one-fifth when the two true re-
morse cases are excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, while an
astonishing 85% of death jurors believed that the defendant did not
so much as "even pretend" to be sorry, 50% of the life jurors ex-
pressed the same view-a percentage that even includes the two true
remorse cases. This figure for the life jurors who thought the defen-
dant did not even pretend to be sorry rises to 56% when the true
remorse cases are excluded, with an additional 8% saying that the de-
fendant acted like he was sorry but that it was merely a show. The
message is clear: while life jurors might be more inclined than death
jurors to characterize defendants as remorseful, an expression of re-
morse is not a prerequisite for a life sentence.
Three categories of capital cases emerge, therefore, when the de-
gree of remorse is viewed as a deliberative factor: (1) cases in which
the jury relied, at least in part, on the defendant's lack of remorse to
justify imposing the death penalty (the nineteen death cases); (2)
cases in which the jury relied, at least in part, on the defendant's re-
morse to justify a life sentence (two cases); and (3) a puzzling but
sizeable residual category of fifteen cases in which the jury gave a life
sentence even though it generally perceived the defendant as not be-
ing sorry for his crime (fifteen cases). A fundamental question arises
from these categories: if remorselessness is as significant a factor for
imposing the death penalty as death jurors state, then what accounts
for so many life cases that also involved defendants whom the jury did
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not perceive as being sorry for their crimes? The next section begins
to examine this question.
III
PIECES FOR SOLVING THE REMORSE PUZZLE
A. The Rarity of the Remorseful Capital Defendant
A necessary starting point is to recognize that the California
study's finding that only two of the thirty-seven jury panels perceived
the defendant 29 as remorseful does not represent an aberrantly low
figure. In fact, it may be on the high side. Richard Moran, a profes-
sor who has served as an expert witness and consultant for the defense
in capital cases, recently observed:
I have testified for the defense in about 25 death penalty hearings
and consulted in a dozen more, and in no case have I seen the de-
fendant show any remorse. Most sit passively, staring into space, ap-
pearing not to care whether they live or die.
Even when finally given a chance to stand up and make a state-
ment ... that can't be cross-examined... [n]ot one has gotten up
and said simply that he was sorry for what he had done, never mind
ask[ ] for forgiveness or mercy, even to save his own life.30
Several factors might explain the rarity of a jury finding that a defen-
dant is remorseful: capital defendants generally may be unremor-
seful,3 ' or they may be disinclined to express remorse out of shame or
fear that the courtroom will see them as insincere, 32 or, absent unu-
sual circumstances, a prosecutor may not seek the death penalty when
the defendant seems truly soriy for his actions. Whatever the explana-
tion, the available data indicate that capital defendants whom the jury
views as truly sorry are the exception rather than the rule.33
29 Although the California segment interviewed jurors from 37 trials, only 36 defend-
ants were involved because two of the hearings involved the same defendant. See supra
notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
30 Why Killers Don't Show Emotion (National Public Radio broadcast, June 18, 1997)
(commentary of Richard Moran).
31 See id. ("[M]ost murderers believe that they were justified in killing their victims.
Too proud, or perhaps too stupid, they are not about to fake remorse and beg for their
lives.").
32 See WHrrE, supra note 2, at 88; cf.James M. Doyle, The Laaryers'Art: "Representation"in
Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 417, 430-31 (1996) (describing difficulties that some
defendants have because they feel vulnerable in the presence of authority). As Doyle
points out, a defendant may feel this way because "[t]he illiterate, the mentally ill, the
retarded, the abused, the poor, all the members of all of the outcast and stigmatized
groups learn to depend on concealment, dissimulation, noncooperation." Id. at 431.
33 This is not to rule out the class of defendants-sometimes called "the guilty but
redeemed"-who become remorseful later. The Texas case of Earla Faye Tucker focused
attention on the possibility that someone might act in an abhorrent fashion and yet later
feel repentant. A teenager heavily involved in drugs, Tucker had participated in a grisly
double murder and eventually received a death sentence. See Tucker Executed as World
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A brief examination of the study's two true remorse cases reveals
why they are somewhat unique as capital cases. In the first case, which
was essentially a lovers' quarrel, the jury was more than willing to as-
sign blame to the victim who was the defendant's girlfriend. She had
taunted the defendant and, according to the jurors, had been "ex-
tremely cruel" and "pushed people further than most humans could
ever go." (M23L13). One juror, who described the victim as "very self-
ish,... aggressive, [and] abusive," said that "the victim deserved what
she got." (F31L13). By contrast, the jurors characterized the defendant
in a markedly less harsh manner. They described him as "a simple guy
that just got mixed up with the wrong person," (F32L13), and as "a very
easygoing man that had been taken advantage of by this lady," (
F33L13). According to the jurors, on the night of the killing, the defen-
dant brought a gun with him "to scare her" because she had been so
abusive, but she still "egged him on, and egged him on, [and] finally
said, 'well, shoot me then,"' (F32L 13), at which point the defendant
shot her.
On these facts alone, the prosecution probably would not have
sought the death penalty. After killing his girlfriend, however, the de-
fendant then fatally shot the victim's brother, who also had been in
the house at the time. The second murder constituted a "special cir-
cumstance" that, under California law, qualified the defendant for the
death penalty.34
Despite the two killings, the jury quickly settled on a life sentence.
While the jurors were troubled by the killing of the brother-"the
brother just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time,"
(F3sL13) -in the end, the jurors thought that the defendant had found
himself trapped in a situation in which he made a tragic decision that
he now deeply regretted. Given that the defendant did not have any
prior criminal record and that he had confessed to his crime, the jury
believed that he was remorseful and presented no future danger. Sev-
eral jurors even expressed regret that he had to be sentenced to life
without parole. One juror described him as "pathetic" and "pitiful,"
and stated that she felt "sorry for [him] as a human being." (F31L13).
Indeed, in stark contrast to the sentiment thatjurors usually expressed
after having convicted a defendant of capital murder, one juror said
the defendant "was kind of soft with me in my heart." (F33L 13). In
light of this unusual fact pattern for a capital case, the panel's opinion
that the defendant was "truly sorry' for his crime is understandable.
Watches, Agiz. REPUBUic, Feb. 4, 1998, at Al (1998 WL 7749450). As a prisoner she became
religious and remorseful for her acts, which led several religious leaders to seek clem-
ency-unsuccessflly-on her behalf. See id. One of the true remorse cases discussed in
this Article is best characterized as a guilty-but-redeemed case. See infra text accompanying
notes 35-37.
34 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1998).
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The facts underlying the second true remorse case, while still not
entirely typical, are more in accord with what is thought of as a typical
capital murder. The defendant, high on methamphetamine, raped
an acquaintance's girlfriend. The acquaintance then returned home,
and the defendant took the acquaintance and his girlfriend hostage,
eventually killing the acquaintance without any provocation.
At his trial, the defendant admitted to the murder but testified
that he was now sorry for his actions. In general, such statements of
remorse at trial are infrequent and often viewed quite skeptically by
the jury.35 In this case, however, the jury believed the defendant's
claim of remorse for two important reasons.
First, the defendant's testimony itself-both in substance and in
terms of manner-was convincing. He fully admitted what he had
done, although he said it was not premeditated, and he spoke in a
manner that reinforced his purported remorse.36
Second, unlike most capital cases, a number of years had passed
between the time of the arrest and the trial. During the interim, the
defendant had become very religious, and the testimony of two prison
ministers confirmed the defendant's religious transformation.3 7 The
unusually long delay between his arrest and trial, therefore, provided
the defendant with a valuable opportunity to present a convincing
"guilty but redeemed"38 case, which is difficult to present credibly
when less time has passed between the commission of the crime and
the trial. True, the jury in this case still struggled over whether to
impose the death penalty, but the defendant's remorse ultimately per-
suaded the jurors holding out for death to change their votes to life.
In sum, absent unusual factual patterns like these two cases, juries
were unlikely to see a defendant as remorseful. At the same time,
however, both the jurors' statements and frequent discussions about
the defendant's lack of remorse strongly suggest that the defendant's
perceived attitude plays a significant role in shaping the outcome of
death penalty cases. And so the puzzle remains: if true remorse is
rare, then what factors influence juries and account for their ultimate
decision whether to impose capital punishment?
35 See infra Part III.D.
36 One juror perceived the defendant's difficulty in testifying articulately as a sign of
remorse: "Sometimes he found it difficult to speak, he was so remorseful." (M 24L 14).
Others saw it as evidence of his mental impairment: "He was just not very intelligent, like a
kid emotionally." (M 25L14). Either way, it successfully elicited sympathy from the jurors:
"Like I said, he wasn't very bright. They wanted us to see his lack of intelligence; they
wanted us to pity him. That's why they put him on the stand, and it worked." (M25L 4).
37 See Sundby, supra note 6, at 1148-49 (discussing the preachers' testimony as an ex-
ample of effective testimony by lay experts).
38 See supra note 33.
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To solve this puzzle, it is necessary to think of remorse in a some-
what different way than simply whether the defendant is truly sorry for
his crime. For while both the life and the death jurors generally char-
acterized a defendant as not sorry for his crime, the life and death
cases did vary in two noticeable ways when it came to demeanor and
remorse.
First, as noted earlier, whereas death jurors often described the
defendant as being outright cocky and defiant, life jurors consistently
described the defendant as emotionally flat but rarely as defiant.3 9
That is, life jurors, while not inclined to perceive the defendant as
being sorry for his crimes, generally did not share the death jurors'
tendency to perceive the defendant as being insolent in his attitude
toward the process.
Second, in addition to the life jurors' less hostile impressions of
the defendant's demeanor, they also were less likely to have been
unanimous as ajury in finding the defendant to be remorseless. For
example, in thirteen of the nineteen death cases, the interviewed ju-
rors unanimously agreed that the defendant was not sorry. By con-
trast, even though significantly more than a majority of the life jurors
overall were convinced that the defendant was not sorry for the kill-
ing, interviewed jurors unanimously agreed that the defendant was re-
morseless in only four of the seventeen life cases. In most of the life
cases, therefore, at least one juror was willing to express some uncer-
tainty about whether or not the defendant was sorry for his actions. In
other words, while life jurors as a whole were unlikely to see the defen-
dant as being sorry for his crime, they were less monolithic and relent-
less than the death jurors when concluding in their case that the
defendant lacked remorse.
These differences suggest that it may be helpful to think of the
defendants' attitudes not only in terms of whether they were sorry for
the crime, but also in terms of their reactions-to the criminal prosecu-
tion itself. Are the defendants in life and death cases presenting dif-
ferent profiles to the juries of how they view the trial process? Might
differences in trial strategy help explain why although both death and
life jurors were unlikely to see the defendant as sorry for his crime,
death jurors were more likely to see the defendant as defiant or cocky?
Thus far, this Article has focused on remorse as synonymous with
the notion of being "sorry"-of defendants feeling guilt and grief over
their actions. However, remorse also can be characterized from a
more minimalist view that focuses not on whether the defendant wr-
ings his hands with grief, but on whether he owns up to his actions in
39 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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some manner and accepts some responsibility for what he has done.40
From this perspective, a defendant's degree of remorse is largely a
reflection of whether the defendant is at least acknowledging the kill-
ing or whether he is refusing to accept any responsibility for the kill-
ing. Viewing remorse from this perspective begins to provide some
pieces for solving the remorse puzzle.
B. The "Denial Defense" Cases
1. The Price of the Presumption of Innocence?
The starting point for analyzing the defendant who does not ac-
cept responsibility for his killing is with those cases involving a defen-
dant who altogether denies committing the murder. In seventeen of
the thirty-seven trials included in the study, defendants presented "de-
nial defenses" in which they maintained their innocence by denying
involvement in the killing.41 It is useful to compare the outcome of
cases in which the defendant used a denial defense with the twenty
"admission defense" cases in which the defendant admitted the killing
but argued that it did not constitute capital murder (e.g., because the
defendant lacked the requisite intent).42
TABLE 5
THE EFFECTs OF THE DENIAL DEFENSE AS COMPARED TO THE
ADMISSION DEFENSE
Denial defense: Admission defense:
Sentence imposed Denied the killing Admits the killing
Death 11 8
Life 5 12
Hung 1 -
This initial comparison reveals that juries in denial defense cases
imposed death sentences at a significantly more frequent rate than in
40 The potential divergence between expressing sorrow for one's crime and merely
being cooperative with a prosecution also has played a role in the federal sentencing guide-
lines. Under the "Acceptance of Responsibility" guidelines, some courts require defend-
ants to demonstrate remorse in the sense of being sorry for what they have done before
they will reduce a sentence, while other courts base their decision on whether the defen-
dant has cooperated with the prosecution. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation,
and "Acceptance of Responsibility". The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 1507, 1508-42 (1997).
41 Professor Goodpaster describes "denial defenses" as defenses that "assert either
that the defendant did not commit the crimes charged or that it cannot be proven that she
did. Alibi, mistaken identity, and reasonable doubt defenses fall into this category." Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 299, 330 (1983).
42 See id. ("Provocation, self-defense, insanity, diminished capacity, and lack of specific
intent are all examples of admission defenses.").
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admission defense cases. Specifically, juries in denial defense cases
imposed death sentences twice as often as they imposed life sentences,
while juries in admission defense cases chose a life verdict over a
death sentence by a three-to-two ratio.
Furthermore, as Table 6 illustrates, the negative impact that the
denial defense has on a defendant's ability to avoid the death sen-
tence is exacerbated when the defendant chooses to testify. By taking
the stand on his own behalf during the guilt-innocence phase and tes-
tifying as to his innocence, the defendant presents the jury with the
clearest instance of someone refusing to accept responsibility.
TABLE 6
THE EFFECTs OF THE DENIAL DEFENSE WHEN DEFENDANT TEsTIFms
Defendant testified &
Sentence imposed claimed innocence
Death 5
Life 1
From this small sample of cases, it appears that juries tend to view
such testimony as an aggravated abdication of responsibility, a finding
reinforced by the jurors' comments in those cases. The jurors ex-
pressed almost universal disfavor toward the defendant's testimony, in
terms of both their belief that the defendant was lyingm-"I kept think-
ing, why not tell the truth, almost like it was an insult to the jury's
intelligence," (FsD 2)-and their dislike of the defendant's attitude on
the stand.
"He was on the stand for about four or five days. He was very
relaxed and unconcerned, like he was, it's hard to say, to use the
right word, like he was 'king of the hill.' He thought he was the top
dog or whatever you want to call it. In other words, he thought
everything he did was right and others should adhere to what he
says. Nothing seemed to bother him." (M26D12).
"His testimony gave the impression that he was very cold, that
he was bothered, inconvenienced by the trial. It seemed that the
defendant's attorneys regretted putting the defendant on the stand
because he made such a bad impression. They pulled him off very
quickly." (M13D11).
"He was lying right through his teeth. Every time they got into
some kind of tricky spot [on cross-examination] he'd start speaking
in Spanish instead of English and we'd have to go to an interpreter.
We knew he could speak English well enough, he was just trying to
make more of a hassle or something." (M27D12);
"He was lying most of the time." (F34D13).
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A number of the jurors also reported that the defendant's testi-
mony itself was what clinched their belief that he was guilty. The fol-
lowing commentary vividly portrays one juror's reaction to the
defendant's testimony and also reveals howjurors absorb the details of
every occurrence in the courtroom:
I was very curious as to how [the defendant], how his side was
going to react to one solid case [for the prosecution]. My thinking
was that he was just going to get up and say, "sorry, we rest." This is
funny; this was very obvious to me. [The defendant] was called as a
witness. You could tell it was an ad hoc decision because the attor-
neys themselves were almost in disagreement-they looked at each
other and [the defendant] was nodding his head and the attorneys
had these very, almost like frowns on their faces. They kind of
looked at each other and said okay. It was very clear to me, or any-
body else that picked this up, that [the defendant] insisted that he
was going to tell his side of the story. And the attorneys were either
disappointed in that decision or were surprised. But anyhow, he
told about the wildest story you've ever heard in your life. From
that point on, actually, I think people felt real relieved, because it
was such a story full of false thinking or, you know, just excuses or
what have you, that even though I was certain I would have felt the
same way, it was almost a relief to know that it was, that my feelings
were so sure that he was guilty [after he testified]. (M28D2) .4
Intriguingly, the jurors also disbelieved the defendant's testimony
in the one denial defense case in which the defendant testified but
still received a life sentence. From their reports, however, the jurors
did not appear to harbor as much antagonism toward this defendant
as the jurors in the other cases in which the defendant testified.
"[He was] neither polite, condescending, or arrogant. He did
a credible job; the testimony was the best he could offer." (M21L 7).
Juror: "He talked very well; he was very intelligent."
Interviewer: "Did that surprise you?"
Juror: 'Yes, it did. He impressed me with his confidence. He
was not like a wild man at all; I can't really describe the impression."
(F35L7).
Several factors might account for the willingness of the jurors in
this case to overlook their disbelief of the defendant's testimony when
choosing the sentence. First, the defendant appears to have been
more articulate when he testified and more appealing in demeanor
than the other defendants who testified. Second, the case involved a
43 In one case, a juror stated that she had harbored a reasonable doubt until the
defendant took the stand: "I became convinced of the defendant's guilt after his testimony,
during the cross-examination. He didn't understand the truth versus a lie." (M2D 7 ). In
another case, ajuror stated that "the guy kind of convicted himself; he hurt his own case by
testifying. If he hadn't testified he probably would have gotten off easier." (M27DI2).
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victim who had participated in the criminal activity-the killing re-
sulted from internal prison gang warfare-a factor that usually influ-
ences jurors toward imposing a life sentence. Finally, the case was the
only one with a testifying defendant that also involved a factor shared
by almost all of the other cases in which the defendant mounted a
denial defense and still received a life verdict: the jury expressed a
lingering doubt about the level of guilt among multiple defendants in
the case. The next section addresses this last tendency in detail.
2. Lingering Doubt: The Difference Between Complete Innocence and
Level of Participation
Past studies have found that ajury's residual doubt about a defen-
dant's guilt can be potentially decisive in swaying the jury's decision
toward a life sentence. 44 Indeed, an attorney may be tempted to
mount a denial defense in the hope that even if the jury does not find
a reasonable doubt, just enough doubt will linger to cause the jury to
impose a life sentence out of a concern that the defendant may be
innocent. The Project's cases, however, indicate that this type of strat-
egy may actually increase the likelihood that the jury will reach a sen-
tence of death with one significant exception: those cases that involve
multiple criminal actors and only circumstantial evidence as to which
of the participants acted as the ringleader.45
In only one of the seventeen denial defense cases did interviewed
jurors harbor residual doubt as to whether the defendant actually had
participated in the murder. Despite frequent attempts by defense at-
44 See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 27-34; see also Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care 1993 U. Iu.. L. RFv. 323,
357 n.236 (noting that lingering doubt about a defendant's guilt is sometimes the strong-
est factor in a jury's decision to impose a life sentence (citing Telephone interview with
Millard Farmer, attorney in Atlanta, Ga. (Feb. 25, 1992))).
45 In an impressive and thoughtful look at the effect of guilt-phase strategy on the
penalty phase, Professor Goodpaster suggests that a "reasonable doubt defense"-that is,
defending by arguing that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof-is "usually
[of] some value... even in... [the face of] ovenvhelming evidence." Goodpaster, supra
note 41, at 331. A careful reading of his position, with its important qualifiers, clarifies that
he is primarily concerned with pleading guilty in lieu of presenting any defense case dur-
ing the guilt phase. See id. at 331-32. This Article's findings do not dispute his point, but
actually support the position that a vigorous guilt-phase defense may benefit the defen-
dant. See infra Part IV. This Article's findings, however, do suggest that the assertion of a
reasonable doubt defense, without any regard for whether it will undermine the case in
mitigation by denying responsibility for the killing, mightjeopardize the possibility of a life
verdict. See infra Part IV. Again, these findings are not inconsistent with Professor Good-
paster's position, which admonishes that the defense must align a reasonable doubt de-
fense with the penalty phase. See Goodpaster, supra note 41, at 332. They only suggest that
serious risks attach to a reasonable doubt defense focused on whether the defendant com-
mitted the killing as compared to a reasonable doubt based on an admission defense, such
as whether the defendant intended to kill the victim. See infra Part IV.
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torneys to argue "lingering doubt" during the penalty phase,46 this
lack of residual doubt existed even when the prosecution based its
case on circumstantial evidence and the jury struggled-sometimes
deliberating for several days-over the question of the defendant's
guilt. But after having decided that the defendant was guilty of mur-
der, jurors in these cases seemed to put aside any earlier doubts and
to proceed on the basis that the defendant undoubtedly had partici-
pated in the murder.47
Indeed, some jurors expressed indignation during the interview
when asked whether they had entertained the possibility during the
penalty phase that the defendant "might be altogether innocent."
Generally, the jurors forcefully responded that they would not have
convicted the defendant in the first place had any such doubt exis-
ted.48 One exchange between a juror and the interviewer captures
this widely shared view and the trouble that jurors had even with con-
ceptualizing the notion of lingering doubt about the defendant's ac-
tual innocence:
Juror: "If I had lingering doubts, then we probably would have
had to stop it back in the verdict."
Interviewer: "But if you didn't. Say you came down with a ver-
dict of guilty of capital murder, but then by the time you got to the
sentencing phase you still had, maybe you didn't have a reasonable
doubt, but you still had some lingering doubts."
Juror: "See in this case I would've thrown it out. I would've had
to if I had lingering, if I had any doubt. I think given the severity of
this kind of punishment, the guilty verdict wouldn't have been able
to come out. There would have been a hung jury if I'd had any
doubt-I didn't have room for any doubts. In this case, in the sen-
tencing part, if I'd had doubts, they probably would have thrown it
out."
Interviewer: "On the death penalty?"
Juror: "On his guilt."
Interviewer: "Right, okay. But assume that twelve people voted
guilty, okay, but say you had enough evidence in your mind that he
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but there might have been
46 In California, although the defense generally is not entitled to an instruction on
residual doubt, the defendant can argue residual doubt to the jury. See People v. Johnson,
842 P.2d 1, 40-41 (Cal. 1992); cf Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1988) (holding
that a defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to a jury instruction on
residual doubt).
47 The jurors' strong certainty of guilt after an initial uncertainty seemed to parallel
somewhat the perspective of eyewitnesses who are initially unsure of an identification but
become convinced of its accuracy once they settle on an identification. See Fredric D.
Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 985 (1977).
48 Only 5% of the interviewed jurors responded that they had even entertained the
"thought" during the penalty phase that the defendant might be altogether innocent.
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some doubt still, or some nagging doubt, but you didn't find it rea-
sonable to find him not guilty."
Juror: "So then would I have been more likely to go for the life
or the death? More likely for the life. But I really would have done
what I said. But in this one, no one was more surprised than I about
this one unfolding. I thought it would just be this long soul-search-
ing thing-but he did it. No doubt."49 (F7D8 ).
As noted, in only a single case did a lingering doubt about the
defendant's complete innocence appear to factor into the jury's deci-
sion to impose a life sentence.50 The jury was initially split over
whether to convict, and it took five days of deliberating before the jury
finally agreed to convict the defendant on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. One of the five interviewed jurors seemed particularly trou-
bled by lingering doubt. This juror said that the possibility that the
defendant might be innocent played a "very important" role in reach-
ing a sentencing decision. In fact, this juror when asked at the outset
of the interview, "Is there anything about this case that sticks in your
mind, or that you keep thinking about?," replied, "I guess, probably
just that I never will know if she was really guilty! It was really hard on
me; it was really hard on everyone." (F 28L4). This juror was one of the
few who was able to distinguish between a reasonable doubt and a
lingering doubt.
Even given the strength of this juror's lingering doubt, however,
it is unclear how important a role lingering doubt played with the
overalljury. Though one otherjuror in this same case responded that
lingering doubt had been "fairly important" to her decision, each of
the other three jurors from the case who were interviewed stated that
lingering doubt had been "not important at all." These three jurors
also responded that they had not considered the possibility that the
defendant "might be altogether innocent" during the penalty phase.
Because the jury in this case quickly agreed to a life sentence
without extended deliberations, it is difficult to predict exactly how
the jurors who harbored lingering doubts about the defendant's guilt
49 Another juror simply refused to answer any questions relating to lingering doubt,
adding that "if there are lingering doubts, it would not get to the sentencing phase."
(Ms0D 14). Similarly, another juror answered, "If I had any doubts, I wouldn't have voted
that way." (FsDg).
It is important to note that jurors who had lingering doubt might find it difficult to
admit, "yes, I had some lingering doubt that the defendant was involved, but we still voted
to sentence him to death." That is, jurors might feel that there is a right answer to ques-
tions that involve lingering doubt, just as they might feel that it would be viewed as wrong if
they stated that the defendant's race entered their decision. On the other hand, jurors
regularly expressed lingering doubt about whether the defendant intended to kill or was
the triggerman. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54, 64-65.
50 This case also was the only trial from the California segment of the Project that
involved a female defendant.
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would have used them in deliberations. Interestingly, the defense at-
torney did raise the possibility of lingering doubt as a factor during
the penalty phase, but he did so in a way that offended much of the
jury:
There was one comment by the defense attorney that many of
the jurors took to heart. He was ridiculing us for coming up with
the guilty decision and saying he doesn't know how we could have
done that. We, especially myself, felt it was inappropriate at that
time to make comments like that. The decision had already been
made; we were there to do the sentencing. But he felt it appropri-
ate or necessary to get it off his chest or something. But when we
went into the jury room to decide, that was the first thing on quite a
few of our minds-like, how dare he chastise us. He doesn't know
what we went through in this deliberation room-the agony and
pain and everything of making the decision, and he just comes out
and says, 'You guys made the wrong decision." He lost a lot of cred-
ibility in our eyes from those comments that he made, but it didn't
affect us as far as deciding what penalty to recommend. (M 1L4).51
Fortunately for the defendant, any offense that the jury felt did not
carry over into its sentencing decision, perhaps in part because it did
not need to consider lingering doubt to be convinced that a life sen-
tence was appropriate. Instead, the jury reached a quick consensus
for life because the defendant neither had a criminal record nor ap-
peared to pose any significant threat of future dangerousness. 52 The
case nevertheless stands out as the only case among the denial defense
cases in which lingering doubt about the defendant's actual guilt
played any role in shaping the penalty decision.
Before dismissing lingering doubt as an insignificant factor, how-
ever, an important qualifier must be added. While lingering doubt
concerning the defendant's actual innocence appeared to play a very
infrequent role in influencing the jury's penalty decision, lingering
doubt seemed to play a far more significant role when the doubt in-
volved the defendant's level of participation in the murder. A shared
characteristic leaps out from four of the five denial defense cases that
resulted in life sentences:53 in each case, more than one individual
51 The juror who had been particularly concerned with lingering doubt described the
incident similarly: "The defense attorney yelled at the jury for finding her guilty because he
couldn't imagine that there was enough evidence to do that. That's what he started out
with, bitching about the fact that we even found her guilty." (F28L 4).
52 The defense also was helped by the fact that the prosecutor did not pursue the
death penalty vigorously. The prosecution did not introduce any evidence at the penalty
phase and was perceived by the jurors as "not terribly invested in what the punishment
would be." (F2,L 4).
53 The only other life case in the denial defense category is the just discussed case in
which some jurors harbored a lingering doubt about the defendant's actual innocence. See
supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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carried out the homicide, and in each case, the prosecution presented
a largely circumstantial case. And as a result, although the jurors in
these cases rejected the defendant's claim of complete innocence,
they remained uncertain about the level of the defendant's participa-
tion or intent. As the jurors' comments indicate, although California
does not limit the death penalty to the defendant who actually did the
killing,54 many jurors felt that the death penalty was best reserved for
the killer or the ringleader:
"[The single most important factor] was his guilt by conspiracy
rather than absolute evidence that he was the killer. We weren't
sure enough to take his life. This made the death decision not right
and unfair." (M 32L1 ).
Interviewer: "What did you folks who voted for life give as your
reasons?"
Juror: "The fact that we weren't 100% sure if he pulled the trig-
ger. I mean we were sure he's guilty-when the crime took place,
he was there." (F37L5).
"What probably saved his life was his partner's DNA test found
his partner's sperm in her body. Had his [sperm] been found
there, he would have been in a much different situation. Had he
assaulted her, [the DNA test] would have proved it, but we didn't
have that proof so we didn't feel he was the principal." (M32L5 ).
Juror: "It was all about the two punishments which he should
get. One juror would say, 'Well, I think he should [get] death be-
cause I believe he did it and that's all there is to it, and look at how
it was calculated murder, in cold blood-he stabbed him twenty
times.' On the other hand, another person would say, 'Yeah, but
there was another person involved who could have possibly been
the principal killer.' That was the main topic."
Interviewer: "So it was really a disagreement as to who was the
principal killer?"
Juror: "Yeah, if there vere witnesses, it would have been so
much easier. I was stressed out during this case-big time." (F37L).
In one multiple-actor case with an especially bewildering array of wit-
nesses, including some inmates who claimed responsibility for the kill-
ing for which the defendant was on trial, one juror concluded that a
life sentence would, in light of such Byzantine evidence, "allow for the
possibility that we made a mistake." (M33L7).
The key to understanding these cases is to recognize that the de-
nial defense in multiple-actor situations does not necessarily operate
fully as an all-or-nothing defense. A prosecution case founded on cir-
cumstantial evidence that only indirectly establishes the roles of the
various defendants allows jurors to conclude that while they believe
54 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1998).
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that the defendant was criminally involved, they also are uncertain
that he was the ringleader or the triggerman. As a result, unlike sin-
gle-defendant cases in which the jury must either hold the defendant
completely responsible for the crime or acquit, prosecutions involving
multiple actors may allow jurors an opportunity to find the defendant
guilty of capital murder while still having lingering doubts about the
extent of the defendant's role.
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, it appears that the denial defense
strategy is not as effective in multiple-actor cases that involve strong
evidence leaving little room for lingering doubt about the defendant's
role as the triggerman or ringleader. For example, two of the denial
defense cases that resulted in a death sentence involved multiple ac-
tors. In both cases, however, the prosecution's case and evidence fo-
cused entirely on the defendant's role as the actual killer. In this
context, the juries' decisions paralleled the all-or-nothing choice that
jurors faced in the single-defendant cases-accepting the prosecu-
tion's evidence inherently required them to find that the defendant
acted as the ringleader.
The trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, the two de-
fendants in the Oklahoma City bombing prosecutions, illustrate this
difference among multiple-actor cases. Even though the two defend-
ants were tried separately (as also was true of all but two of the study's
multiple-actor cases), each trial had implications for the other. Be-
cause the Government's evidence identified McVeigh as the bomber,
even in light of other possible co-conspirators, 55 his jury had to choose
between the Government's theory that McVeigh had masterminded
the bombing and the defense's claim that McVeigh was completely
innocent. Because the Government had argued that McVeigh was the
bomber, however, Nichols both could maintain his complete inno-
cence and still vigorously contend that the Government's largely cir-
cumstantial evidence did not tie him to the bombing as a fully
knowing participant.56 This strategy created a gray area that enabled
the jury to find that Nichols had been involved but to a lesser extent
than McVeigh, which the jury believed did not justify the death
penalty.5 7
The following table summarizes the three denial defense scena-
rios that have been discussed.
55 See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano, McVeigh Case Hinges on the Circumstantia4 LA_. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1997, at Al (explaining the circumstantial nature of the prosecution's case cou-
pled with the defense's coconspirator theory).
56 See DavidJosar, Nichol's Tial Strategy: I'm Not McVeigh, DFTRorr NEws, Sept. 22, 1997,
at Al.
57 See Lynda Gorov, No Nichols Death Penalty:Jurors Deadlock; Judge Will Sentence, BosrON
GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
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TABLE 7
DENIAL DEFENSE CASES
Multiple actor killing
Single Strong evidence defendant Circumstantial case
actor killing was leader/triggerman as to leader/triggerman
Death 9 2 -
Life 1 - 4
Hung 1 -
Though caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions from a
sample of thirteen cases, the imbalance in outcomes is hard to ignore
when one looks at the cases in which the prosecution essentially
presented the jury with an all-or-nothing choice between accepting
the prosecution's argument and the defendant's position (i.e., single-
actor cases or multiple-actor cases with strong evidence that the defen-
dant was the leader). The jury returned a death verdict in eleven
cases and a life sentence in only one. (In one additional case, the jury
hung on the sentence, and the retrial resulted in a death sentence.)
Nor did the outcomes for this subset of cases appear to depend on
whether the defendant actively presented evidence to prove his inno-
cence (eight cases) 58 or only argued that the prosecution's evidence
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had participated in
the murder (five cases). 59
In sum, only in those cases in which the prosecution asked the
jury to deduce from ambiguous circumstantial evidence that the de-
fendant had acted as the ringleader from among several participants
did a denial defense appear not to skew the jury heavily toward impos-
ing a death sentence. Thus, it may very well be that lingering doubt
about actual innocence is the "strongest possible mitigating evi-
dence,"60 but the cases included in this study suggest that creating
such a lingering doubt is very difficult. In this light, the defense care-
fully and realistically should assess the likelihood that it can create
doubt before pursuing a denial defense strategy.6'
58 Of the eight cases in which the defense presented evidence, six resulted in a death
sentence, one in a life sentence, and one in a hung jury on the sentence. In six of the
eight cases, the defendant testified that he was innocent. See supra text accompanying
notes 41-43.
59 All five cases resulted in a death sentence.
60 White, supra note 44, at 357 n.236. Indeed, the only case included in this study that
created a lingering doubt among some jurors about the defendant's actual guilt was the
one life case in the single-actor category. In that case, several of the jurors based their
decision to seek a life sentence in part on their lingering doubt. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 50-52.
61 On the other hand, in at least two of the five Florida life cases that they studied,
Geimer and Amsterdam identified lingering doubt as to actual innocence as a factor. See
Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 27-30. They found lingering doubt as to participa-
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C. The "Admission Defense" Cases: Confession Is Good for
More Than Just the Soul
The outcomes of the denial defense cases make evident that de-
fendants who invoke the presumption of innocence and put the
state's evidence to the test generally increase their risk of receiving a
death sentence. By contrast, the admission defense cases-in which
defendants contest an element of the crime (e.g., premeditation) or
challenge the existence of a special circumstance (e.g., the killing was
intentionally carried out for financial gain)6 2 rather than deny their
participation in the crime-present a different proffle of outcomes.
Twelve of the twenty admission defense cases included in the study
resulted in life sentences, and eight resulted in death sentences.
The difference between the outcomes in denial and admission
cases is not surprising if the cases are analyzed with a focus on accept-
ance of responsibility. Importantly, the defendants in the admission
defense cases at least have acknowledged responsibility for the deaths
even if claiming that their crimes do not rise to the level of capital
murder. The significance of accepting responsibility as a theme be-
comes even more evident once the admission defense cases are fur-
ther parsed based on factors bearing on acceptance of responsibility.
One would expect that if a defendant's acceptance of responsibil-
ity truly does influence the jury's decision making, a defendant's ver-
bal acknowledgment of his killing would increase the likelihood of
receiving a life sentence. The pool of admission defense cases largely
bears out this expectation.
The confession cases further underscore the role of a defendant's
acceptance of responsibility when one focuses on how the confessions
came about. In five of the twelve pretrial confession cases, the defen-
dant either had voluntarily turned himself in to the authorities or had
been arrested on unrelated charges and then brought up the killing
on his own. In all five cases, jurors responded very favorably to the
defendant's actions, and all five cases resulted in life sentences. 63 By
contrast, the jurors perceived confessions in two of the three death
ion and intent in the other three life cases. See id. Their finding of lingering doubt about
actual innocence in two cases (compared to only one in this Study) from a much smaller
sample suggests that the ability to create a lingering doubt successfully may depend on
various factors that vary by state and locality, such as the local prosecutor's policy on what
cases are pursued as capital cases and on the use of accomplice testimony.
62 Because defenses that challenge the existence of special circumstances both admit
the crime and deny the special circumstance, Professor Goodpaster classifies them in a
mixed category of "admission and denial" defenses. Goodpaster, supra note 41, at 332.
Because this Article focuses on admission of the underlying killing, it treats these types of
defenses-which admit the defendant did the killing-as admission defense cases.
63 In one case, for instance, jurors focused not on the crime spree that culminated in
the defendant's arrest, but on the fact that when arrested, "he voluntarily confessed to an
unsolved murder. In the absence of a confession, it would have been a very difficult case
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TABLE 8
ADMISSION DEFENSE CASES AND VERBAL ADMISSIONS
Resulting sentence
Time of confession Life Death
Defendant made pre-trial confession of killing 9 3
Defendant first verbally admitted killing in guilt-phase
testimony 1 -
Defendant first verbally admitted killing at penalty phase - 1
Defendant never verbally acknowledged killing 2 4
cases not as voluntary admissions of guilt, but rather as attempts by the
defendants to deny their crimes until the police confronted them with
sufficient evidence to break them down and effectively force them to
confess (though this was equally true for two of the nine confessions
in the life cases). Importantly, the life jurors did not seem to require
confessions that were spill-the-soul statements along the lines of "I in-
tended to kill the victim and now deeply regret it." Instead, the state-
ments often left room for the defense later to argue that the killing
did not rise to the level of capital murder.
Unlike the denial defense cases, therefore, a defense asserting
that the defendant had participated in the killing but that his involve-
ment did not rise to the level of capital murder did not appear to
invite a backlash if the defense was plausible based upon the facts.
Defendants in life cases frequently used three admission defenses: (1)
they lacked a culpable mental state because, for example, the killing
was unintentional or not premeditated (ten cases); (2) their commis-
sion of the killing did not qualify as a felony-murder special circum-
stance (three); and (3) they either had been provoked by the victim
or had acted out of self-defense (three cases).64 Moreover, in seven of
the twelve life cases, the strategy produced a lingering doubt among
some jurors over whether the defendant had intended the killing or
in some way had been provoked by the victim. As one would expect,
these doubts pushed jurors in the direction of a life sentence.65
because there was nothing to place him there. If he had denied it, it would have been
difficult." (Ms4Ls).
64 Because some cases involved more than one of the defenses, the total number of
cases is more than 12.
65 Jurors had doubts about the defendant's intent far more often than they ques-
tioned whether the defendant was not involved with the killing. Although only 5% of all
jurors had even entertained the "thought" that the defendant might be completely inno-
cent when they ultimately decided the punishment, see supra note 48, 49% had contem-
plated the "thought" during sentencing deliberations that the defendant "definitely killed
the victim, but might not have planned, intended, or wanted to do so." These perceptions
are also the type of lingering doubts that Geimer and Amsterdam generally found in the
life cases included in their study. See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 28-34.
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D. Statements Expressing Regret at the Penalty Phase
The final category of cases to examine encompasses the eight
cases from both the denial and the admission defense categories in
which the defendant either testified during the penalty phase and ex-
pressed remorse or communicated his remorse through a psycholo-
gist, family member, or other intermediary.
TABLE 9
DEFENDANTS ExPRESSING REGRET DURING THE PENALTY PHASE
Life Death
Admission defense cases
Defendant admitted killing prior to penalty phase through
confession or guilt testimony 3 1
Although defendant did not contest killing at guilt phase, first
time defendant personally admitted to the killing was at
penalty phase - 1
Denial defense cases
Defendant first admitted killing at penalty phase - 3
Again, while recognizing that small samples make generalizations dif-
ficult, the data reinforce the notion that the earlier the defendant per-
sonally expresses some type of acceptance of responsibility for the
killing, the greater the likelihood that the jury will be receptive to
later claims of regret. Simply put, when it comes to accepting respon-
sibility, the sooner the better. Indeed, where the evidence supports
the sincerity of a defendant's purported regret, many jurors identified
the defendant's testimony as securing the life sentence.
"His remorse and his sincerity [in testifying] made everything
else more believable-because if you don't express remorse, then
you wonder if he has just been putting you on about that religious
thing." (M25L14).
"We got into watching him and his expressions. We were trying
to see if he was remorseful. He didn't really show it that much until
it got to the penalty phase. That's when he really came across as
remorseful. A lot of us had questions and were watching his facial
expressions." (M35L15)66
On the other hand, it appears that statements of remorse and
acceptance of responsibility that first come at the penalty phase gener-
ally do not persuade the jury to grant mercy. Without any prior ac-
ceptance, jurors often view statements of regret that are first made
66 The defendant in this case, however, did not convince all the jurors of his remorse.
Some jurors "really debated" whether the defendant's testimony "was staged and whether
he had been coached." (FnLis).
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during the penalty phase as disingenuous attempts to avoid a death
sentence after the jury already has convicted him of capital murder.
Particularly telling were the three denial defense cases in which
the defendant had argued during the guilt phase that the prosecution
had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but then later con-
ceded his guilt during the penalty phase and expressed regret over
the killing. In these cases, the jurors reacted unfavorably to the
change in position.
"[He] testified and said he was sorry, but he didn't show it by his
actions." (MlID 14).
"He said he deserved to die, but it came across as fake; we got
the impression he was trying to use reverse psychology on us."
(F1 D).
"His testimony emphasized how out of control he was; he had
no remorse." (F11D13).67
Interestingly, in none of the three cases did the defense affirmatively
present evidence during the guilt-innocence stage to prove the defen-
dant's innocence. Instead, the defense merely had argued to the jury
that the prosecution had failed to prove that the defendant was the
killer beyond a reasonable doubt. These cases suggest that even a
barebones "reasonable doubt" denial defense may not leave room for
defendants to later admit their guilt and express regret during the
penalty phase, at least without appearing to deceptively shift
positions.68
Thus, while jurors often expressed exasperation that a defendant
had not testified during the penalty phase, 69 the cases suggest that
unless the defense had laid the groundwork earlier for the defen-
dant's statement of remorse, the jurors likely would have perceived
67 Even when the defendant did not express regret at the penalty phase, but the de-
fense appeared to at least tacitly acknowledge the defendant's guilt, jurors tended to react
negatively. For example, a juror in one case thought the change in position showed that
the defense at the guilt phase had been "just a trick to put doubt in our minds," (M1OD1 ),
while another juror in a different case thought that making the jury decide guilt only to
then admit guilt at the penalty stage "reflect[ed] badly on the defendant," (Ml 5D16).
68 Similarly, Professor Goodpaster has suggested that if the prosecution's case-in-chief
turns out to be very strong, then it might be strategically prudent for the defendant to
admit guilt instead of allowing the reasonable doubt defense to go to the jury. See Good-
paster, supra note 41, at 332.
69 As one juror said, "[T] here was a lot of why the hell didn't he get his butt up there
and say something. Beg!" (M6D 6 ). Some jurors, however, recognized not only that a de-
fendant might not have made a credible witness ("He gave me the impression that he
wasn't too eloquent. I guess he didn't want to take the chance of giving the wrong impres-
sion."), but also that the jury would view his testimony skeptically ("Then I brought up [to
the jury], even if he were to testify that he was remorseful, would you have believed him?
Because wouldn't anyone to save their lives?"). (M31). Thisjuror also suggested that the
prosecutor would have "chewed [the defendant] up" if given the opportunity to ask pre-
sumptively phrased questions on cross-examination like, "now, when you picked up the
knife while you were holding his hair and slitting his throat .... "
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any such testimony as manipulative. Indeed, actions that jurors usu-
ally perceive sympathetically-such as a defendant reacting emotion-
ally to a family member's testimony-often were viewed negatively
when they contrasted sharply with the defendant's other behavior
before and during the trial: "He didn't have any remorse; he didn't
cry. Actually, I think he probably cried when his mom testified, but
some of those things are coached in order to extract some kind of
sympathy from the jury." (M 14D 15).
IV
PIECING TOGETHER THE REMORSE PuzzLE: THE GUILT AND
PENALTY PHASE TANGO
In 1976 the Supreme Court heralded the movement to a bifur-
cated trial for capital cases as a major advancement in procedural fair-
ness from the unitary system that some states previously had used.70
The Court believed that by separating the guilt and penalty phases,
bifurcated trials would alleviate the pressure on defendants to waive
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and their
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on the issue of guilt.7 1 Under
the bifurcated system, defendants theoretically can contest their guilt
without incurring the risk that the jury will hear prejudicial sentenc-
ing information (e.g., prior crimes) and still preserve their opportu-
nity to argue against the death penalty if ultimately convicted.
While the bifurcated trial certainly provides valuable procedural
safeguards, it also has the potentially perilous allure of lulling defense
counsel into thinking of the guilt and penalty phases as independent
and distinct productions, rather than as two acts of a play before the
same audience. This allure tends to be particularly great for defense
attorneys who do not have prior experience in capital cases and there-
fore concentrate more on the familiar guilt phase at the expense of
preparation for the penalty phase. That is, they overlook the impact
that the defense strategy during the guilt phase will have on the pen-
alty phase. 72 Yet if the defense does not approach a capital case, even
though it is bifurcated, as a unified presentation, it greatly increases
70 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976).
71 See id. at 190-92 & n.41. In the earlier case of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971), the Court rejected a challenge to a unitary sentencing scheme based on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 217.
72 This observation is based in part on the author's experiences with the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse, a law school clinic that provides assistance to attorneys ap-
pointed to represent capital defendants.
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the risk that the guilt-phase presentation will doom the case in mitiga-
tion during the penalty phase. 73
This danger is precisely why experts on capital litigation stress the
importance of harmonizing the guilt and penalty phases, and why
they urge defense attorneys to exercise caution before advancing a
denial defense of complete innocence. 74 This Article's findings add
strong empirical emphasis to these admonishments-in the study,
twice as many denial defense cases resulted in death sentences
(eleven) than life sentences (five). Moreover, four of those five life
cases fell into the specialized category of killings which involved multi-
ple actors and uncertain circumstantial evidence concerning the de-
fendant's precise role in the killing. Indeed, in the single-defendant
cases, the figures for the denial defense cases that reached a verdict
are particularly stark-nine death sentences compared to one life sen-
tence.7 5 This data indicate that absent a marginal case in prosecution,
a defendant is essentially playing lottery odds by relying on an all-or-
nothing guilt phase strategy that challenges the prosecution in the
hope of producing a lingering doubt that will secure a life sentence.
But while the usual explanation for the danger of a denial de-
fense is that it undermines a later ability to express remorse convinc-
ingly during the penalty stage, the fact is that most defendants do not
even try to express remorse. And even if they do, the jury is unlikely
to believe them. In this light, it might be more useful to conceptual-
ize the problem in terms of juries applying their own rough "accept-
ance of responsibility" guidelines.76 That is, capital juries do not
necessarily insist that defendants show that they are "truly sorry" for
their crimes. If that were the case, after all, then the overwhelming
majority of life cases should have resulted in death sentences. 77 In-
stead, jurors tend to react favorably to actions or strategies that com-
municate some acknowledgment of the defendant's responsibility for
the crime.
73 For an overview of the penalty phase and the role of mitigating evidence, see gener-
ally Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitiga-
tion in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991).
74 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 5, at 1054 (suggesting that a "vigorous denial of guilt"
will "nullify a convincing demonstration of remorse" at the penalty phase); Doyle, supra
note 32, at 423 (noting the "tension between the strategic goals" of the guilt and penalty
phases); Goodpaster, supra note 41, at 329-30 (discussing dangers created by the denial
defense); White, supra note 44, at 356-58 (stressing the need to develop an overall strategy
for the guilt and penalty phases).
75 One of the nine death cases was a retrial before a separate jury after the first trial
ended with a hung jury on the sentence. See supra note 7.
76 Cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1 (1998) (providing that judges
may consider a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for his offense as a mitigating
factor).
77 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
1998] 1589
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
By conceptualizing remorse in terms of acceptance of responsibil-
ity, one can begin to make sense of its marked influence on the jury's
decision in at least two important ways. First, as the Project repeatedly
has found, a defendant's potential future dangerousness looms over
the entire decision-making process. 78 Even in California, where the
only alternative to a death sentence in capital cases is life without pa-
role,79 jurors expressed concern that the defendant might eventually
be released.80 Jurors are inclined to view a defendant that makes no
attempt to acknowledge complicity-especially in the face of strong
evidence against him-as someone likely to use every future opportu-
nity to manipulate the system. Putting the prosecution's evidence to
the test, therefore, may cause jurors to perceive the defendant as not
simply exercising his due process rights, but rather as once again try-
ing to "beat the system."
He just acted like he didn't do it-so why would he be remorse-
ful or bitter or anything? He was very confident that he was going to
get off. His demeanor gave me the impression that "I didn't do
anything wrong, so I don't need to worry about it." Even when the
verdict was handed down, he still was the same. It was real strange.
Once I was convinced that he did it, I was convinced that he was
kind of cold blooded and didn't have any feelings, basically. I
didn't think he was crazy or anything. Ijust felt he'd do anything to
get what he wanted. (FD5)).81
Indeed, this perception of the defendant as manipulative and confi-
dent of "getting off' may help explain why death jurors' descriptions
of the defendant's demeanor-while sharing the life jurors' descrip-
tions of the defendant as emotionally flat-are also more heavily
laden with adjectives like "cocky," "arrogant," and "nonchalant. '8 2
Second, when the defendant has not made any prior indication
that he accepts responsibility for the killing, a jury is likely to view
cynically a case in mitigation that centers on influences beyond the
defendant's control-such as child abuse-as nothing more than a
final attempt to deny responsibility. Yet, as one commentator has ob-
78 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1993) (finding that jurors are most concerned
with a defendant's future dangerousness).
79 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
80 See Sundby, supra note 6, at 1166 n.119 (noting that 50% of the California jurors
expressed some level of concern that the defendant would be released upon parole); Wil-
liam J. Bowers & Benjamin Steiner, Death by False Choice and Forced Choice: Empirical
Evidence of Misguided Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 31-32 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
81 "He showed no regret, no remorse-he was acting like he wasn't there." (F17D). A
strategy that involved denying guilt during the guilt-innocence phase and later admitting it
during the penalty phase struck jurors as "reflecting badly on the defendant," (M15D16),
and as "grasping at straws," (Fs9Ds).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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served: "Everything is lost if the jury (having just convicted the defen-
dant of murder) interprets the use of mitigating material as an
attempt to excuse the murder or evade responsibility."83
In presenting its case in mitigation, therefore, the defense walks a
tightrope. At the same time that the defense tries to help the jury
understand how factors beyond the defendant's control influenced
him, it must minimize the appearance of placing the blame on every-
one but the defendant himself. Walking this tightrope is not easy,
especially when the defendant did not make any substantial attempt to
accept responsibility before the penalty phase. The following jurors'
comments are typical ofjurors in cases in which the defendant main-
tained a denial defense at the guilt phase and then presented mitigat-
ing evidence at the penalty phase.
"I thought it would have been a better move for him to make a
plea because we saw no remorse-almost a cocky attitude. He
wanted to blame others for the crime because other people sold
him drugs and stuff." (F19D15).
"I don't think he was capable of being sorry. How can you be
sorry for what you can't take responsibility for? I don't think he had
accepted responsibility for the killing, honestly. I think he put the
blame on society." (F40D15).
"He was arrogant. He showed no remorse in his testimony [at
the guilt stage], and he didn't even show any at the penalty phase.
It was like, 'This is why I'm like I am. I'm a poor little boy that
didn't have any proper upbringing and I've been beat and abused
all my life.'" (FD 12).
"I had a sense that he was mad, and like, this is not my fault,
society did this to me, everybody else did this to me. That was his
general demeanor. Because, see, he testified on his own behalf
[and denied guilt], so I have a basis for the impression that I have of
him and the reason why he felt that everybody else had done him
wrong." (F15D2).
"At the sentencing stage, the impression I got was that he still
didn't understand what had happened, that he couldn't keep blam-
ing other people, that he had to take responsibility for what he had
done." (M15D16).
In short, unless the defendant demonstrates acceptance of responsi-
bility prior to the penalty phase, the jury likely will see mitigation evi-
dence bearing on the defendant's upbringing and mental capabilities
through a jaundiced perspective along the lines of "there he goes
again, placing blame on everyone but himself."
By contrast, jurors were more receptive to mitigation cases when
the defendant previously had expressed some acceptance of responsi-
83 Doyle, supra note 32, at 439.
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bility for the killing. This tendency was especially true in cases in
which the defendant acknowledged from the outset of the trial that he
had done the killing.8 4 Although many jurors initially seemed sur-
prised that the defendant did not contest his guilt vigorously, they
usually understood his strategy by the start of the penalty stage:
[The defendant] anticipated the guilty verdict. It was my belief
up to that point in time that many of the things that had been said
in foundation were leading up to what I think was the real intent of
the defense attorney, and that was not so much to find [the defen-
dant] not guilty of the crime as charged, because he admitted it, but
to mitigate the reasons for his crime due to his background and
hopefully get life in prison without possibility of parole. (M20Ls).
Indeed, in this particular defendant's case, his confession to the
crime, together with his minimal defense during the guilt stage, led
some jurors to conclude that the trial had instilled "peace of mind" in
the defendant. (M37L3).85 One juror described the defendant as
"looking resolved-but not in a bitter sort of way, just accepting."
(M34L3). And while the jurors disagreed over whether his admission
of guilt reflected remorse,86 every one of the interviewed jurors viewed
his acceptance of responsibility as a positive sign that he would behave
well in prison.
Jurors similarly were impressed with another defendant who took
the stand during the guilt phase and acknowledged responsibility for
the killing, even when the prosecutor challenged him:
When he was testifying, I had the feeling that he was not very
bright, that he was socially immature, that he was very awkward. He
was very sorry-felt real remorse. He did not make any excuses for
himself. Interestingly, he was able to handle the prosecution fairly
well. He didn't break down-he stuck to his story and his responsibility
for what happened. He really did not let the prosecutor intimidate
him that much. (F38L 15).
As with the prior case, not all of the jurors agreed that the defendant
was sorry.8 7 Nonetheless, his admission of guilt helped lay the founda-
tion for evidence introduced during the mitigation case, such as testi-
84 In one case, ajuror recalled that the defense attorney in his opening statement had
admitted that the defendant was the killer, saying, "'This is not a who-done-it,' those were
his words, 'this is not a who-done-it." (F 41L 14).
85 "His attorneys were more apologetic than they were anything else during the guilt
phase." (M37L3).86 One juror, for instance, stated that the defendant "requested right away to be sen-
tenced-he demonstrated remorse," (M38L3), while another maintained that "I never saw
any signs of being sorry," (F 21L3).
87 "He was a frightened kid begging for mercy-he didn't know how to be sorry or to
show he was sorry." (F41 15). Anotherjuror noted that "we really debated, there were some
that questioned whether [his testimony] was staged and all, whether he had been
coached." (F8115).
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mony from a prison guard that he had been cooperative and had
adjusted well to prison.
As noted earlier, even a vigorously pursued admission defense, as
long as the defendant based it on a plausible set of facts, did not ap-
pear to undermine confessions and other acts of acceptance of re-
sponsibility.88 Unlike the denial defense cases, the jurors generally
did not perceive as manipulative or deceptive the defense's argument
that the prosecution had failed to prove that the killing arose to capi-
tal murder: "It was almost like, well if you guys vote second-degree
murder, then thanks a lot kind of thing, but we're not really shooting
for that because it's just the preponderance of the evidence is so over-
whelming." (M39L2 ).89
These cases indicate that denial and admission defenses send sig-
nificantly different messages to the jury when the defense introduces
mitigation evidence bearing on the defendant's responsibility (e.g.,
88 See supra Part III.C.
89 One juror's description in a different case reflects a remarkable understanding of
the defense attorney's approach:
The defense argument was solely that he did murder someone, however it
was not premeditated murder; it was something less than murder in the
first degree. It was manslaughter, it was voluntary manslaughter, involun-
tary manslaughter, it was something other than capital murder. The de-
fense case focused on, I think from day one, on "maybe I can get this guy
less than life without parole or the death penalty." That was the focus and
[the attorney] did as good ajob as he could with respect to the facts he had.
I think [the attorney] didn't have necessarily a plan going forward when
the trial started, and I think that was intentional. He wanted to hear the
evidence that the prosecution would put on and then would establish what
his defense was. If the prosecutor put on a real good, terrific case, he then
would proceed accordingly, and his cross-examinations kind of indicated
that. He focused, for example, on some questions: "could it have been an
accident?" For example, [with] the forensic people [the attorney asked]-I
hope I've used that term correctly, the people that were testifying in regard
to the physical evidence-"Could it have occurred another way? Could
[the defendant] have been frightened?" And the answers he was getting
back from these prosecution witnesses wasn't enough for him to help him
to try to make a case of accident, mistake, [or] error. Big example-three
bullets or four bullets were done at close range in the guy's head, and he
asked questions: "Is there any possibility that they weren't done at close
range, that they were from a distance?" Because what he tried to do, he
tried to maintain that the victim picked up a rock, which the guy probably
did, and that they shot him out of fright-they were afraid of him. Which is
kind of ludicrous, but the facts just didn't turn the way he wanted them to,
so there wasn't any, ever any doubt that they shot him. So the issue then
became what degree. He was fun to watch; he really is terrific. [You
should] read some of his transcript of the testimony, his closing argument.
He set forth, you know, "ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this murder, this
occurred, could have occurred in one of four ways," and he said four. He
said, "I leave it to you to judge which way it occurred. But I do have an
opinion." His opinion was it certainly was not murder in the first degree,
maybe second degree or manslaughter. What he tried to do was convince
the jury that the facts constituted this crime as opposed to this crime, not
that a crime hadn't occurred. And he did an excellent job at it. (MALO).
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mental impairment or child abuse). After a denial defense, jurors are
likely to characterize this type of mitigation evidence as the defense
saying, '"We tried to convince you that the defendant was not responsi-
ble for the killing, but since you found him guilty, let us explain to you
why he is not fully responsible for becoming the killer that we claimed
he wasn't." This shift in the defense's message inevitably will contrast
sharply with the prosecution's relentlessly consistent stance from the
guilt phase onward that the defendant is a cold-blooded, remorseless
killer.
On the other hand, a strategically presented admission defense
can set the stage for mitigation evidence to fit seamlessly into an over-
all story rather than require a dramatic shift in the storyline. Con-
sider, for instance, the very different message a defendant sends to the
jury during the penalty phase when he acknowledges responsibility for
the killing but argues that he acted in self-defense during a drug deal
gone awry (a defense that, if accepted by the jury, would have resulted
in an acquittal). The defense attorney now can argue, "Although you
have found that the circumstances surrounding the drug deal did not
amount to self-defense, we should explain to you how the defendant
became involved in such dealings in the first place, how his mother
was a prostitute, how she started using Joe when he was but in the
third grade to go buy drugs for her and her tricks ...." If presented
in this way, the mitigation evidence no longer represents an inconsis-
tent change in the overall story. Rather, it becomes an effective tool
to help the jury understand more fully the context of the crime about
which they already have heard.
Moreover, an admission defense sometimes was an effective
mechanism for raising matters during the guilt phase that mitigated
the defendant's culpability, such as showing that the defendant had
played a lesser role in the crime or that the victim had been engaged
in drug dealing or other high-risk behavior. Raising these issues at the
guilt stage often helped prepare the jury for the defense's later argu-
ment against a death sentence at the penalty phase. The jury's per-
ception that the defendant had not been a leader or that the killing
had not been premeditated, for example, were influential factors in
many life cases, even though they did not necessarily disqualify the
defendant from the death penalty.90 Consider one juror's comment
that typifies this effect:
The reason that we lightened the sentence up on him was the fact
that he seemed to have been drug along, that he was easily influ-
enced. He was not really that aggressive in this whole act. And his
90 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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whole participation in it seemed to involve holding her while [the
other defendant] stabbed her. (M41L16).91
The defense often developed this type of evidence at the guilt stage
through cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses and experts,
setting the stage for an argument at the penalty phase that the defen-
dant did not deserve the death penalty.
In fact, although it may initially sound inconsistent with the ac-
ceptance of responsibility theme, one can make a convincing argu-
ment that it is often strategically unwise to enter a guilty plea during
the guilt-innocence phase and thereby move the trial directly into the
penalty phase. 92 As Professor Goodpaster has observed, a guilty plea
concentrates all of the aggravating evidence into the penalty phase
rather than allowing the jury to hear at least the crime evidence at the
guilt stage, which may help diminish its impact by the time the penalty
phase takes place. 93 A guilt-innocence trial also may enable the de-
fense to introduce mitigating evidence, such as the defendant's
mental impairment, earlier in the proceeding. Introducing mitigat-
ing evidence early adds an additional humanizing dimension to the
image of the defendant as a two-dimensional, cold-hearted killer-an
image the jurors are otherwise likely to form prior to the penalty
phase.9 4
Not pleading guilty, therefore, does not necessarily mean that the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility will be undermined as with a
denial defense. Depending on the nature of the evidence, the most
effective defense at the guilt-innocence phase might be as simple as a
tacit guilty plea that expressly establishes a theme of accepting respon-
sibility.95 Alternatively, the defendant may find it best to use a more
forceful defense that raises doubts about his intent or role. In short,
the key is for the defense to structure the guilt-innocence presenta-
91 When asked the defendant's occupation, this juror replied, "scapegoat." (MoL16).
92 In some states, such as Virginia, defendants who plead guilty also waive their right
to have a jury decide the sentencing issue. See VA. S. CT. RuLE 3A.13; Pruett v. Common-
wealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 8 (Va. 1986) (ruling that waiver ofjury under Rule 3A-13 by pleading
guilty also applies to capital cases).
93 See Goodpaster, supra note 41, at 331-32.
94 The Susan Smith case illustrates how the defense can soften the jury's image of the
defendant by placing its mitigation case into evidence during the guilt-innocence stage. In
the Smith case, the prosecution inserted the defendant's motive into issue during the guilt-
innocence phase by stating that Smith had killed the boys for selfish reasons. See Agent
Testifies Smith Was "Remorseful, Suicidal" CHARLESTON GAzETrE, July 21, 1995, at 2A. Doing
so provided the defense with an opportunity to introduce rebuttal evidence, such as evi-
dence of Smith's severe depression. See id. This allowed the defense to help the jury ap-
preciate, prior to the penalty phase, that the crime wvas not simply a cold-blooded,
remorseless killing.
95 Recall a juror's description of the one attorney's defense as merely "apologetic."
See supra note 85.
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tion in a way that harmonizes with the mitigation theme during the
penalty stage.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS: THE ETHICS OF TRIAL STRATEGY
IN CAPITAL CASES
This Article's findings suggest that when capital jurors consider
the defendant's degree of remorse in their decision making, it is not
solely in the narrow sense of the defendant expressing sorrow for the
killing. Though jurors undoubtedly place a great deal of weight on a
sincere expression of sorrow, the reality is that such expressions are
not only rare but also rarely believed even when made. By no means,
however, is this to say that the defendant's attitude, toward both the
killing and the trial, does not play a significant role in the jury's deci-
sion-making process. Rather, capital trials are situations to which the
old saying-actions speak louder than words-truly does apply. The
more evidence that the jury can find indicating the defendant's ac-
ceptance of responsibility for the killing, the more likely the jury will
return a life sentence. The reasons are simple: an acknowledgment of
responsibility by the defendant tends to soften any appearance that he
is dangerously manipulative while also diminishing the jury's tendency
to dismiss mitigation evidence as merely another hollow attempt by
the defendant to place the blame somewhere else.
The most difficult situation for a defense attorney in a capital
case, therefore, arises when a client wants to contest fully his guilt and
argue that he was not the killer. In some cases, the lawyer will be
ethically obligated to present a denial defense despite the possible in-
creased risks of a death sentence-the most obvious situation occur-
ring when the defendant is in fact innocent of the crime. The more
troubling case is when the defendant insists on pursuing a claim of
complete innocence despite strong prosecution evidence to the con-
trary. Now, the attorney is faced with a situation in which the defen-
dant desires to undertake a defense strategy that may prove to be not
only unwise but deadly.
The decision of whether to pursue a claim of innocence rightfully
belongs to the defendant.96 This Article's findings, however, strongly
suggest that attorneys have an obligation to explain fully to the defen-
96 The underlying tension over which decisions the defendant should make and
which belong to the defense attorney often is brought out in high relief during capital
representation. The recent Unabomber prosecution vividly illustrates this tension at work.
The defendant, Theodore Kaczynski, vigorously objected to any defenses that suggested he
was mentally ill. See Emelyn Cruz Lat, Kaczynski Plea Deal: Guilty Unabomber Suspect Couldn't
Represent Self, Judge Had Ruled, S.F. EXAMuNER, Jan. 22, 1998, at Al. Yet his attorneys argued
that evidence of his mental illness might dissuade the jury from a death sentence during
the penalty phase. See id. This tension eased only when the defendant agreed to plead
guilty, and the Government agreed not to pursue the death penalty. See id.
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dant the possible impact that a denial defense strategy will have on the
penalty phase. Even a defendant who has been involved with the
criminal justice system in the past is unlikely to understand a capital
trial's dynamics and the potential ramifications of a guilt-phase strat-
egy on the penalty phase.97 Yet the data presented in this Article indi-
cate that few factors may have as great an influence on the jury's
ultimate decision of whether to impose the death penalty as the pres-
entation of a denial defense in the face of strong evidence that the
defendant was indeed the killer. An attorney's failure to inform fully
the defendant of these potential consequences of a guilt-phase strat-
egy might even raise a "reasonable probability that, but for [the] un-
professional error[ ], the result of the proceeding would have been
different,"98 constituting grounds for a charge of ineffective assistance
of counsel.99
To suggest that defense attorneys may be constitutionally and
ethically obligated to inform their clients of the potential conse-
quences of a denial defense is not to ignore the possible negative im-
pact this advice may have on the attorney-client relationship. When
the defendant is maintaining that he is in fact innocent, an attorney
legitimately may be concerned that raising the possibility of admitting
the killing will undermine any sense of trust. This possibility certainly
argues for waiting until a relationship with the defendant has devel-
oped before broaching the subject and for laying out the strengths
and weaknesses of the prosecution's case in a nonjudgmental and
clear-eyed fashion. If done in this manner, the defendant is more
likely to understand that the attorney is speaking to him out of a con-
cern for the defendant's best interests.100
At a minimum, defense counsel would be greatly remiss to pursue
a run-of-the-mill strategy of challenging the prosecution's case for fail-
ing to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before weighing care-
fully the potential impact such a strategy will have on the penalty
phase. The hope of creating a lingering doubt as to the defendant's
guilt appears likely to succeed only in very limited and specific situa-
tions-cases in which the prosecution is relying on circumstantial evi-
97 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1962). Gideon overruled Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), a case in which the Court had justified denial of counsel, in
part, on grounds that the defendant's prior conviction ensured that he was "not wholly
unfamiliar with criminal procedure." Id. at 472.
98 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984).
99 Cf United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a claim of
ineffective assistance existed when counsel's inadequate advice regarding a plea offer un-
dermined defendant's ability to make an intelligent decision about whether to accept it).
100 When an attorney and client have an ongoing relationship, counsel may be able to
convince the client not to pursue a claim of innocence in the face of a strong prosecution
case. See White, supra note 44, at 357 n.235 (citing Andrea Lyon, Director, Illinois Capital
Resource Ctr., Evanston, Ill. (Mar. 22, 1992)).
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dence and the defendant is one of several criminal actors.10' A capital
case clearly is one situation in which blindly relying on the presump-
tion of innocence and putting the prosecution's evidence "to the test"
may prove to be fatal.
Even a defense attorney that pursues an admission defense strat-
egy must carefully ensure that it does not undercut the jury's sense
that the defendant accepts responsibility for the killing on some level.
Some factors, such as whether the defendant has confessed, inevitably
will be beyond counsel's control by the onset of the trial. The guilt-
phase presentation itself, however, will send an influential message to
the jury, and the attorney must harmonize that message with the one
sent during the penalty phase. Thus, while juries seem more receptive
to admission defense challenges-including arguments that the pros-
ecution failed to prove culpable intent, that the killing did not qualify
as felony-murder, or that the defendant acted in self-defense-than
denial defenses, the presentation must be plausible and not under-
mine the defendant's basic acknowledgment of the killing.
In the end, it seems that once capital juries reach the penalty
phase, they act more as risk-and-blame assessors than as absolvers.
Only rarely will a defendant convince ajury that he is truly sorry to the
point that the jury will vote for a life sentence as some form of absolu-
tion. In most capital cases, defendants will present far murkier,
bleaker, and less convincing pictures of their remorse. Even in those
cases, however, all is not lost. Although jurors are certainly more in-
clined to impose a death verdict on a remorseless figure who sits emo-
tionless throughout the trial, they do not demand full atonement
before giving a life sentence. Jurors seem willing to settle for signs
that the defendant at least acknowledges some responsibility for the
killing-signs that dampen the jurors' concerns over the defendant's
dangerousness and make them more receptive to mitigation evidence
as to why the defendant does not deserve to be sentenced to death.
101 See supra Part III.B.2.
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